



An Investigation on How Social 
Constructivism Uses Technology to 
Define Reality
178In my paper I want to focus on the social 
constructivists and their approach of using technology to 
define (constructed) reality. Based on this, constructivists 
argue that technology can be a means to define social roles. 
Furthermore, I want to analyze this theory on the practical 
example of the photographs of women in different phases of 
hysteria, based on Georges Didi-Huberman’s book Invention 
of Hysteria (1982).
Social roles are constructed, a statement many people 
would agree with. This so called social constructivism is 
based on the book The social construction of reality (1966) 
by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The theory is 
used to describe how individuals or groups participate 
in matters of the community. Those participating people 
not only agree with the theory but they also have to work 
actively on this ongoing process of change and adjustment. 
Therefore one can say that the social constructivism gets 
its support through the interpretation, the motives and 
the knowledge of people (Ozor, 2016).
In my paper I want to argue how photography in the 
year 1900 was used to “classify” hysterical women, which 
led to their role as social outcasts. Furthermore, I will focus 
on the way how social constructivists use technology to 
construct reality. This argument will lead to the question 
if their approach to construct reality also “works” on the 
argued case of the hysterical photographs. 
The first part of the paper will give a short overview 
of the core arguments of the constructivist theory, their 
supporters and their approach to construct the nature 
of reality through the focus on the modern technological 
society. Therefore, I will give a short insight on the reasons 
why theorists, like Bruno Latour, argue for the conjunction 
of social constructivism and technology. 
Afterwards, the second part will introduce a historical 
case study of photographs of women in different phases of 
hysteria. The main source of literature will be Georges Didi-
Huberman’s publication L’Invention de l’hystérie (1982) 
(Invention of hysteria). This case study is for the topic of 
social constructivism interesting because technology (the 
camera) made the photographs of the hysteric women and 
through that they received the social label of “outcasts”. 
This part of the paper will also discuss that the women 
put themselves in the position of “being shown” in the way 
of being different. And being different made them to not 
compatible with the society and therefore “outcasts”.
The last two parts of the paper will be used to 
analyze the case study through the theory of the social 
constructivism. In the end the constructivists will argue 
that photography is reliable method to construct reality. In 
the last part of the paper I will argue that it’s not a reliable 
method and that it’s therefore not able to grasp reality. 
A (really) short introduction to 
Social Constructivism 
Constructivism is a philosophical term which was 
used to describe how people learn. A Learner is actively 
constructing his/her own understanding of something. 
Furthermore for constructivists the objective Truth is 
unknowable. This means that a person is having his/
her own subjective experience and constructs their own 
unique understanding of an objective reality. Still there 
are different constructivist theories on how accurate a 
subjective interpretation of an objective reality can be. 
However, all constructivists agree on one thing: it is not 
possible for a person to reach an “absolute Truth”, no matter 
what methods are involved (Luckmann: 1991: 14-17).
Besides the topic of knowledge and reaching the 
objective truth, there is also the debate on the nature of 
reality. For the sake of clarity and simplicity I will use the 
four clauses that Ian Hacking formulated to visualize the 
core of the constructivists’ theory and therefore some 
of their “main problems”. The following clauses are, like 
nearly every philosophical argument, debatable (Kukla, 
2000: 2-6). But for the means of my argument this will do.
“Constructionists about X tend to hold that:
•   X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it 
is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by 
the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 
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Very often they go further, and urge that:
•   X is quite bad as it is.
•   We would be much better off if X were done away 
with, or at least radically transformed. 
•   In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted, 
X appears to be inevitable.” (Hacking, 1999: 6).
Hacking argues that one may realize that 
something, which first seems inevitable in the present 
state of things, was not inevitable at all and is not a bad 
thing. “But most people who use the social construction 
idea enthusiastically want to criticize, change, or destroy 
some X that they dislike in the established order of things.” 
(Hacking, 1993: 7).
This X can be defined through two different 
constructivist views. Based on the paper of D.C. Philipps 
you can separate constructivism into two groups: 
•   The “Individual Constructivists” argue that reality 
is discoverable. According to those theorists it is 
possible to get an understanding of the objective 
world through certain research methods. However, 
this does not including having “knowledge about 
x”. 
 Supporters of this theory, like Jean Piaget or Lev 
Vygotsky, focused their work on cognition. In 
general this means that their approach is to analyze 
the mental representation that a person has while 
experiencing the world (Phillips, 1996: 6-8).
•   The second group is called “Social Constructivists” 
with their most prominent supporter: Bruno 
Latour. In their approach they focus on the social 
and political dynamics, which enables to socially 
construct an understanding. Furthermore, reality 
is for these theorists inconsequential. The more 
radical constructivists argue that there is no such 
thing as an objective reality (Phillips, 1995: 8-9).
Latour was one of those theorists who introduced 
the methodological premise that the modern world is 
composed of a network of social actors. Furthermore, 
that network includes living people and non-living 
technological entities (Winner, 1993: 366). He disagrees 
with the opinion that “science is about the discovery of 
truth whereas technology is about the application of truth.” 
(Winner, 1993: 365). According to him a conventional 
distinction between technology and society is no longer 
existent. In his essay “Do you believe in reality?” Latour 
points out that if the sciences achieved anything, then it is 
that they “added” reality to science and not withdrawn any 
from it (Latour, 1999: 2). This can be seen for the social 
constructivists as a chance to construct reality through 
technology. 
Langdon Winner sees this approach in his paper 
more skeptical. For him Latour’s view seems to be like 
looking inside the Black Box to show a colorful array of 
social actors, processes, and images and they all visualize 
the dynamics of conflict, disagreement and consensus. 
But what Latour doesn’t mention is that technology, while 
it surveys the evidence, lacks to offer a judgement or an 
answer to what it all means (Winner, 1993: 367-368). Of 
course there are those who wouldn’t use the word “lack” 
as being an issue. For them this means the chance for 
interpretation and something like “total objectivity”.
Technology seems to be the overall answer to many 
questions that social constructivists may be looking for, 
but still, they seem to take certain basic commitments of 
modern technological society for granted. “The attitude of 
the social constructivists seems to be that it is enough to 
provide clearer, well-nuanced explanations of technological 
development. [...] Perhaps the helpful insight they want to 
offer is simply that choices are available, that the course 
of technological development is not foreordained by 
outside forces but is, instead, a product of complex social 
interactions.” (Winner, 1993: 375). Latter leads to the key 
question in which ways our technology-centered world 
might be constructed. 
In this way of working with technology the 
constructivists have to first establish how technology is 
involved in the human affairs. Afterwards the “relevant 
social groups” have to be located, which are involved in the 
development of a particular technological device or system 
or process. Varies of interpretations of what a particular 
technological entity in a process of development means 
and how people act in different ways to achieve their 
purposes within that process. 
As one can see the approach to define a constructed 
reality through technology has its limitations. Specially 
based on the questions and the focus one can find in the 
theory of constructivism. This will be now discussed in the 
following chapter by a practical example. 
Photographs of Hysterics – A Case 
Study
Hippocrates defined “Hysteria” in his thirty-fifth 
aphorism, where it is said: “When a woman suffers 
from hysteria or difficult labour an attack of sneezing is 
beneficial.” (Gilman, 1993: 11-11). For the ancient thinkers 
hysteria included the view that the uterus is endowed with 
the capacity of movement. This means that the woman’s 
womb is some sort of an animal. And its shaking means 
moving and agitating and it is just as dreadful as lechery, 
suffocation, swoons and real semblance of death (Gilman, 
1993: 11).
This was the most prominent belief on the origin 
of hysteria and alternative explanations like the one from 
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German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel were rather seldom. 
For him the madness of hysteria was nothing other 
than a simple contradiction within reason. This means 
that, in principle, a madwoman should be supposed, 
or presupposed, to be quite simply a reasonable being 
(Gilman, 1993: 23).
In the second half of the 19th century Jean-Martin 
Charcot started to treat hysteria as a physical illness. His 
new scientific and analytical approach had its capital in 
the famous Salpêtrière. This teaching hospital and asylum 
in the modern sense had its first principle in the treatment 
of madness and was the general hospital for women, or 
rather for the female outsiders of society.
Charcot’s teaching methods included experiments 
as an ethic of science. Hysteria made repetition a necessity 
(maybe even an obsession) and through the use of the same 
patients the ethics became soon aesthetics. This happened 
precisely in a way to not lose its “science-making” aspect 
(Didi-Huberman, 2003: 180).
In his way of teaching and experimenting Charcot 
can be easily compared to a stage director: While he 
focused on the clinical and pedagogical methodology, he 
started his lectures with: ““In a moment I will give you a 
first-hand experience, so to speak, of this pain [hysteria]; I 
will help you to recognize all its characteristics” – how? – 
“by presenting you five patients”– and he would have them 
enter the stage of his amphitheater.” (Didi-Huberman, 
2003: 45). Besides the live experiments Charcot saw in 
photographs an experimental procedure, a museological 
procedure (scientific archive), and a teaching procedure (a 
tool of transmission). Didi-Huberman points out that the 
importance of photography for Charcot cannot be judged 
high enough, because through this technical medium he 
had a museological agency of the “observation” of the sick 
body. Now he had the possibility to generalize the sick 
cases into a tableau (Didi-Huberman, 2003: 30).
The photos of the women in different hysterical 
phases [see images 1-3] supplements and explicates the 
images. They provide a commentary or legend for that 
which is supposed to be its essential mysterious content. 
After all the images were meant to illustrate, clarify, and 
prove the truth of the clinical discourse (Didi-Huberman, 
2003: 32).
“When the body executes movements in 
various ways, or of such great extension 
that they cannot be directly inscribed on a 
piece of paper, photography compensates for 
mechanical procedures with great ease: it 
reduces the amplitude of movement, or else 
it amplifies it to a more suitable scale” (Didi-
Huberman, 2003: 32).
This discreet but astonishing passage to the limit, 
in which medical practices relating to hysteria became 
a figurative invention, was only possible through the 





of his hysterics into a masterpiece. The women became 
the living image of the concept of the illness, and the 
physician practically glorified it – as an image. Even though 
the photographs seem to be taken freely, there were still 
procedures for posing: platforms, discreet yokes, boxes for 
framing the image (Didi-Huberman, 2003: 32).
Still it is obvious that there is no neutral distance 
between the subject and the physician. The photographer 
Paul Régnard published a series of those Salpêtrière 
images in a catalogue named Iconographie photographique 
(1876 and 1877). Those two volumes included also images 
that weren’t used for lectures or other documentary 
purposes. On one of those photos the body of one of the 
physicians himself can be seen, using a long needle to 
pierce the arm of a young woman. For Didi-Huberman the 
young hysteric has a “knowing” smile – a smile of consent, 
as if contemplating the serious nature of the situation 
with an understanding of the experimentation on her 
anaesthetized body, and doubled with the procedures of 
photographic exposure (Didi-Huberman, 2003: 42).
Figuring and directing, but always at the limits 
of falsifying. For Didi-Huberman this is experimental 
fabrication. But still this method could not escape the 
figurative problem that obsessed every medical clinic: The 
problem of the link between seeing and knowing, seeing 
and suffering. How could all this passion be produced 
from figures of pain? This is the crucial phenomenological 
problem of approaching the body of the Other and of the 
intimacy of its pain (Didi-Huberman, 2003: 46-49). To put 
it differently: the problems we have here is the problem of 
seeing, because through experimentations on bodies they 
tried to make some part of them – their essence – visible. 
In the Salpêtrière something was constructed. 
Something in the form of a great optical machine to 
decipher the invisible lineaments of a crystal: the great, 
territorial, experimental, magical machine of hysteria. 
To quote Didi-Huberman: “[…] In order to decipher the 
crystal, one had to break it, be fascinated by its fall, then 
break it again and invent machines permitting an even 
more visible, regimented fall, and then break it once again 
– just to see.” (Didi-Huberman, 2003: 9-10).
But this produced a paradoxical situation: the more 
the hysteric delighted in reinventing and imaging herself 
to a greater extent, the more a kind of ill was exaggerated. 
A mutuality of charm was created between physicians, 
with their never-ending desire for images of hysteria, and 
hysterics, who willingly participated and actually raised the 
stakes through their increasingly theatricalized bodies. In 
this way, hysteria developed from an illness to a spectacle. 
Didi-Huberman calls it the moment hysteria was invented. 
Thereby the photographs helped to promote Charcot’s theory 
of the four “classic” stages of hysteria. The photographs did 
not only help to create those stages, because at a certain 
point the physician-patient dynamic lead to develop hysteria 
further or to construct even new hysterical poses that did not 
exist before (Decker, 2005: 354).
Photography as a means of reality (?)
For Walter Benjamin photography “is the means 
through which the beginning of a confrontation [caused by 
history] occurs. […] this confrontation is not seen for what 
it is – the beginning of a general confrontation between art 
and technology, rather a confrontation between art and 
one mode of technology – confirms the extent to which 
photography is only the beginning of a development […]. 
Photography provide[s] a local habitation for the political 
significance of history. Photography becomes, in this 
sense, not merely a means of producing images, but rather 
becomes itself an image, a technique for the production of 
history’s political significance.” (Benjamin, 2006: 22).
Benjamin felt himself confronted with the discussion 
if photography should be a “slave” (Benjamin, 2006: 22) of 
the arts.1 Based on the quote he argues that photography 
is not art but a medium to capture history and “becomes 
an image” itself. Latter is the acknowledgment of the 
uniqueness and authenticity of photography, because 
there exists only one photography with exactly “that” 
person on it, with exactly “that” pose and exactly “that” 
composition. Every other sample of “that” photography is 
just a copy from the first one.
So with this argument of Benjamin photography 
receives a unique role, because it becomes the source of 
accuracy. But this is also the moment where one could say that 
photography is a medium for reality. Latour would say yes. 
So photography turns into a unique image, which 
can also be a source for history and a proof for reality. In 
this case the reality would be the hysterical women as 
being different to other (healthy) women and their role as 
social outcasts through their “otherness”. 
For the social constructivists reality is constructed, 
but here I ask: is that enough? 
In the example of hysteria the photographs were 
used as a way of documentation and as a proof for Charcot’s 
theory. Furthermore, they were a means of making the 
illness a spectacle. This was enabled through the methods 
of art, like staging, composition or posing. A further 
element of the creation of the images was the physician-
1 The less dramatic formulation would be to call photography 
a „form of art“. Still, this description wouldn’t capture the 
quintessence of Benjamins argument. Calling photography the 
“slave of the arts” makes the negative relationship between arts 
and photography visible. A relationship which is – for Benjamin 
– not balanced or equal.
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patient dynamics and the willingness of the hysterics to 
start to exaggerate. At this point it should be mentioned 
that contemporary studies question how deep Charcot 
was involved in the production of the photographs. Even 
though some argue that he wasn’t involved at all, he still 
had the benefit of the images promoting his theories. 
This case visualizes perfectly the double-sidedness 
of technology as…
•   A source for a constructed reality
•   A documentation for fabrication. 
Conclusion
In the final and last part of this paper we can 
now formulate three points (or problems) that social 
constructivism has when it comes to elaborating the 
reality construction through technology:
•   The social constructivists’ view on technology 
as a method for reaching a constructed reality 
should be handled carefully. They seem to lack an 
explanation for the problem of a multicentered 
spectrum of technical possibilities and in some 
ways some social interests are favored while 
others are excluded. 
•   Furthermore, they neglect the possibility that there 
are dynamic pieces of evidence in technological 
change beyond those revealed by studying the 
immediate needs, problems, solutions, and 
interests of specific groups and social actors. 
•   And finally one has to be satisfied with the rather 
radical point that reality is constructed. 
To me, the third one seems rather unwise. Social 
constructivists find themselves here in a difficult position: 
By saying that there is only one reality, which is constructed, 
they fail to deliver a satisfying explanation for the shift of 
the social roles to explain the physician-patient dynamic 
and the way a “not judging” technological medium infects 
the social roles. 
By agreeing to two realities (one of them is 
constructed), they could argue to use the constructed 
reality as a tool to reach the “absolute reality”. Still, there 
is the question: have we reached it (the absolute reality) 
yet? And when we do – how do we notice that? 
The photographs of hysterics are an impressive 
example of the way how social roles can shift and how 
difficult it is to define a “role for technology.” Also it is 
impressive to analyze the physician-patient dynamic and 
the tools of photography. In the end, it’s not only reality 
which seems to be problematic to grasp through this 
example, but also the definition of an illness and therefore 
the uprising question of “what is normal/healthy” and 
what is art?
Sažetak
Doris Stadler,  
„Otkriće histerije“ Kako društveni konstruktivizam 
koristi tehnologiju kako bi opisao stvarnost?
U ovom se radu želim fokusirati na društveni 
konstruktivizam i njihovu upotrebu tehnologije kako bi 
se opisala stvarnost. Na temelju ovoga, konstruktivisti 
argumentiraju da tehnologija može biti sredstvo određivanja 
društvenih uloga. Nadalje, željela bih analizirati ovu teoriju 
putem praktičnog primjera fotografija žena u različitim 
fazama histerije iz knjige Georgesa Didi-Hubermana 
„Invention of Hysteria“ (1982.).
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